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I. INTRODUCTION
Most readers of this Article probably have encountered—and been
frustrated by—password-complexity requirements. Such require-
ments have become a mainstream part of contemporary culture—the
more complex your password is, the more secure you are, right? So the
cybersecurity experts tell us. Moreover, policy makers have accepted
this “expertise” and have even adopted such requirements into law
and regulation.1
This Article asks two questions. First, it examines whether com-
plex passwords actually achieve the goals many experts claim. Does
using the password “Tr0ub4dor&3” or the passphrase “correcthor-
sebatterystaple” actually protect one’s account? Concluding complex
passwords are a red herring, as recently confirmed by the federal
standards makers,2 this Article then examines why such require-
ments became so widespread.
Through analysis of historical computer-science and related litera-
ture, this Article reveals a fundamental disconnect between the best
available scientific knowledge and the application of that knowledge
to password policy3 development. Discussions with computer scien-
tists who were leading experts in computer security during the period
1. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 624 (D.N.J.
2014), aff’d 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015); Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011);
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDE TO ENTERPRISE PASSWORD MANAGEMENT
(DRAFT) (2016), https://crsc.nist.gov/crsc/media/publications/sp/800-118/archive/
2009-04-21/documents/draft-sp800-118.pdf [perma.unl.edu/9S3F-F574]; see also
Password Complexity Policy, CORNELL U., https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/about-ilr/
faculty-and-staff-resources/technology-services/technology-policies/password-com
plexity [https://perma.unl.edu/WYH6-DNSR] (providing Cornell University’s ILR
School password-complexity policy).
2. During the publication stages of this Article, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) released revised guidelines regarding password complex-
ity, effectively reversing its position and recommending against widespread use
of highly complex passwords for authentication purposes. PAUL A. GRASSI ET AL.,
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBL’N 800-63B, DIGITAL IDENTITY
GUIDELINES (2017), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP
.800-63b.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/BJ9K-T3VX]. Shortly thereafter, in a media
interview, the original lead author of those standards at NIST publicly spoke out
against his original decision to recommend such policies, largely on the basis of
the fact they caused more harm than was prevented. Robert McMillan, The Man
Who Wrote Those Password Rules Has a New Tip: N3v$r M1^d!, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-man-who-wrote-those-password-
rules-has-a-new-tip-n3v-r-m1-d-1502124118.
3. I use “policy” broadly throughout this Article to refer to any legislative, regula-
tory, or organizational policy impacting complexity requirements for passwords.
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when password-complexity policies developed suggests that the dis-
connect between scientific literature and policy outcomes cannot be
fully explained by a simple failure of computer-security researchers to
identify the shortcomings of complex passwords. Nor can it be fully
explained by a failure of computer-science research to consider the
user design implications of password complexity and associated re-
search in psychology. This Article proposes the alternative hypothesis
that the disconnect resulted from a “stovepiping” failure of a different
type—the failure to convey relevant scientific knowledge in a frame-
work which could drive a shift in policy direction.4
A common approach to arguing for policy reversal or change is the
presentation of new evidence. However, this Article posits that in cer-
tain contexts mere contrary or “corrective” evidence may be insuffi-
cient. This is because of the effects of policy inertia, which result in a
state where more evidence is required to reverse a policy than would
have been required to implement it in the first place. Frequent vacilla-
tion of policy positions can have destabilizing effects on economic mar-
kets and social structures, and within certain highly technological or
scientific contexts, this differential may be even more harmful. Using
cybercecurity as an example, this Article proposes the hypothesis that
in such cases, the same (high) level of evidence should be required for
implementation of policy in the first instance as is required for subse-
quent reversal or revision of policy.
Under such a hypothesis, in the context of complex passwords, the
result would be that this higher standard of evidence was not met af-
ter computer science gained understanding that password complexity
did not address the problems it claimed to solve. Thus, what was re-
quired for policy reversal was not merely new computer-science evi-
dence but the characterization of that evidence within a framework
demonstrating that continuing the original course of action was actu-
ally resulting in a worse condition than originally existed. In fact, this
type of net benefit/loss economic framing was largely missing from the
discourse regarding authentication at the time and, indeed, remains
deeply undertheorized in contemporary discourse regarding cyber-
security policy.5
The implications of these results are compelling. If the assertions
in this Article are correct, the technical complexity of society has
vastly outstripped our policy-making process’s ability to keep pace. A
dystopian view of this result suggests we are heading toward technoc-
racy. (How did you feel the last time Facebook or Google implemented
a major overhaul?) A perhaps more optimistic view, however, suggests
that such technical complexity is not a new concept in relative terms
4. For a discussion of the concept of stovepiping, see infra Part II.
5. See supra note 2.
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and that historical context can provide some guidance as to how to
adapt.
This optimistic view proposes that regulatory history may provide
suggestions for regulating rapidly changing fields like cybersecurity.
Looking to other fields such as medicine, aviation, and other technolo-
gies whose development outpaced the policy makers of the time can
provide such insight for the Information Age. Each of these fields had
to develop a scientific knowledge base upon which to base policy
frameworks and evaluate subsequent policy changes. Developing a
science of cybersecurity and requiring evidence-based policy making
can provide solutions applicable to the specific problems presented in
this Article, and that process of developing a scientific base as a regu-
latory prerequisite may also benefit other highly technical subjects
faced by an increasingly complex society.
Simply put, cybersecurity policy making must, as with other tech-
nical fields, move towards requiring evidence-based policy making in
the first instance. To do otherwise in such a highly technical and rap-
idly evolving field undermines the very purposes of the regulatory pro-
cess itself, particularly in the context of delegation to “expert”
administrative agencies. This Article examines that concept through
the lens of the specific problem of password complexity and offers a
policy making prescription by way of example: the myth of “risk pre-
vention” must be replaced with the empirically founded calculus of
risk management. And the primary question to be addressed must not
be “Is your system secure?” but rather “Do your risk mitigation tech-
niques match your risk tolerance?”
II. THE CONCEPT OF STOVEPIPING
Academic research departments often debate the concept of
“stovepiping”—the idea that intense focus within their own discipline,
while beneficial to depth-oriented research, decreases the likelihood
that broader questions may be investigated. In recent years, many
major U.S. research institutions have increased the number of inter-
disciplinary or cross-disciplinary initiatives.6 While a promising
trend, examples like those presented in this Article suggest the trend
may not be adequate to address the complex technical problems facing
an increasingly interconnected society. This paper explores, through
the example of information-security regulations, the disconnect be-
tween how legal and policy communities versus technical and scien-
tific communities formulate questions. That disconnect, combined
with the increasing interconnectivity and resulting complexity in
6. See Creso M. Sa´, “Interdisciplinary Strategies” in U.S. Research Universities, 55
SPRINGER SCI. & BUS. MEDIA 537 (2008).
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global society, suggests that traditional policy-making processes may
be inadequate to address certain contemporary challenges.
This project began with the hypothesis that a lack of interdiscipli-
nary integration within computer-science research failed to identify
the shortcomings of complex passwords discussed in section III.A. of
this Article. While only a small percentage of the literature on pass-
word complexity has addressed this concern,7 based on discussions
with computer scientists8  involved in early password policy making
and feedback received during the development of this Article, that hy-
pothesis appears incomplete. It is important to note that there exists
little, if any, formal literature documenting this history. Substantial
credit is owed to Professors Steven Bellovin, David Clark, and Mat-
thew Blaze for their direct recitation of relevant history during the
development of early password-authentication practices during the
1980s and early 1990s.
The initial inquiry of this Article began from the hypothesis that
computer-science research failed to account for certain human factors,
thus leading to the production of incomplete evidence that formed the
basis of policy recommendations. This hypothesis seemed unsatisfy-
ing, however, because substantial research into human–computer in-
teraction and human factors (in technology) has been ongoing for
several decades.9 Furthermore, discussion with leading computer
scientists during the period when password-complexity policies first
were developed indicated that, even if unpublished, at least some key
components of the computer-security community recognized that raw
password complexity was not a simple tradeoff. Based on this knowl-
edge, this Article posits a revised hypothesis suggesting that, notwith-
standing an understanding of various factors, the policy-making
processes—at the legislative, regulatory, and organizational levels—
were mismatched with the processes for developing and refining tech-
nical knowledge to adapt to changing situations, particularly in the
context of matters of “safety and security.”
Thus, the “stovepiping story” is not one of a failure of computer-
science research to recognize human factors and incorporate expertise
from psychology, sociology, and related fields. Rather, this Article pro-
poses that the disconnect resulted from a stovepiping failure of a dif-
ferent type—the failure of any scientific or policy discipline to connect
7. See, e.g., DINEI FLORENCIO ET AL., DO STRONG WEB PASSWORDS ACCOMPLISH ANY-
THING? 5–6 (2007), https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotsec07/tech/full_pa
pers/florencio/florencio.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/6MRZ-7DLK].
8. In large part, there is a lack of authoritative literature surrounding many of the
topics I discuss in Part II. The foregoing paragraphs detail information and opin-
ions gained from my own conversations with computer scientists, including
Professors Steven Bellovin, David Clark, Matthew Blaze, and others.
9. See, e.g., BEN SHNEIDERMAN, DESIGNING THE USER INTERFACE: STRATEGIES FOR
EFFECTIVE HUMAN–COMPUTER INTERACTION (1986).
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the results of scientific knowledge to a characterization which could
drive a shift in policy direction. Factors such as policy entrenchment10
and heightened standards for justification of policy rescission11 make
the process for changing policy direction more stringent than that for
establishing initial policy. Furthermore, the fear of moving away from
a known quantity (an apparent “protective measure”) to an unknown
quantity—particularly when that unknown quantity involves removal
of the original protective measure—is a well-known condition which
organizations and policy makers resist. After all, “nobody ever got
fired for buying IBM,” as the old saying goes.12
Several computer-science articles identify the shortcomings of com-
plex passwords, with some even going so far as to assert that the com-
plex-password proposition is fundamentally flawed in the modern
context.13 What this body of literature fails to accomplish, however, is
developing a model for overcoming the policy inertia already in place
with respect to password complexity. Overcoming this inertia, as dis-
cussed above, requires not simply demonstrating the inapplicability of
the original proposition but taking a step further to demonstrate the
harm caused by maintaining policies based on the original proposi-
tion. Put simply, what is missing from the existing debate is a demon-
stration that complex passwords cause more harm than good.
This Article articulates that calculation and further identifies that
within the context of cybersecurity, such tradeoffs must be the ap-
proach through which researchers frame policy-oriented results and
through which policy makers translate research into rules. The ex-
isting “technological arms race” of cybersecurity is hopelessly doomed
as system complexity will always introduce new opportunities for com-
promise. Rather, as discussed in Part IV, a risk-analysis/risk-mitiga-
tion approach is required to develop long-term solutions to
cybersecurity problems that endure technological change. Similarly,
such an approach may be applicable to other areas of policy making
where technological change is likely to disrupt social, political, or eco-
nomic assumptions inherent in carefully crafted policy solutions.
10. See generally Antonios Kouroutakis & Sofia Ranchorda´s, Snoozing Democracy:
Sunset Clauses, De-Juridification, and Emergencies, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 29
(2017); Sofia Ranchorda´s, Time, Timing, and Experimental Legislation, 3 THEORY
& PRAC. LEGIS. 135 (2015).
11. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 41–42 (1983).
12. See generally H.O. Maycotte, Your Startup Dilemma: Nobody Ever Got Fired for
Buying IBM, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/homaycotte/
2014/12/09/your-startup-delimma-nobody-ever-got-fired-for-buying-ibm [https://
perma.unl.edu/N2VX-WZCW].
13. See FLORENCIO ET AL., supra note 7.
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III. STOVEPIPING IN CYBERSECURITY
Information security, or “cybersecurity,”14 presents an interesting
quandary for researchers. Many of its elements, such as encryption
algorithms, require the development of deep subject-matter knowl-
edge to solve new problems. Yet at the same time, defending a com-
plex system requires a wide breadth of knowledge including how
administrative, technical, and physical elements interact with one an-
other. This interaction requires understanding not just the appropri-
ate subfields of computer science but operations science, psychology,
economics, and many other fields as well.
A. Policy Making, Complexity, and Change
The failure to consider properly the interaction among many fields
of expertise may have negative impacts beyond mere less-than-opti-
mal outcomes. If the advice given by depth-oriented expertise is not
properly contextualized within the problem of the overall technologi-
cal and operational system, the result may in fact be policies that are
worse than had no action been taken. Depth-oriented expertise may
recognize this concern but fails to contextualize it within a compre-
hensive risk-analytic framework workable for policy makers.
However, this disconnect does not stop at the development of scien-
tific and technical knowledge; it is key to issues of policy making, par-
ticularly in safety and security contexts. Those contexts are
instructive of one part of the problem: the emotional need not to de-
crease security or to implement measures that give the appearance of
comfort, a concept often colloquially described as “security theater.”15
The context of cybersecurity is instructive of the second half of the
problem—rapidly changing technology and societal structures outpace
14. As noted by Professor Andrea Matwyshyn, “Referring to all of information secur-
ity, particularly in private sector contexts, as ‘cybersecurity’ is technically incor-
rect.” Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the
First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 817 n.99 (2013). Matwyshyn describes
this misnomer as ignoring the aspects of physical security inherent in “holistic”
protection of data maintained by an enterprise. Id. I concur with this assessment
and further suggest, as consistent with the administrative–technical–physical
breakdown adopted by the example of information security in healthcare, 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2012), that such a characterization also overlooks the ad-
ministrative aspects involved in protecting and securing information. See David
Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Re-
quirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907 (2013) (discussing the distinction
between purely technical restrictions on computer usage and comprehensive ad-
ministrative, technical, and physical restrictions thereon). Cybersecurity remains
the common term with which most readers will be familiar, and thus I utilize that
term when describing the matter generally.
15. See generally ADAM SLAGELL, FEAR, UNCERTAINTY, AND DOUBT: THE PILLARS OF
JUSTIFICATION FOR CYBER SECURITY 2–4 (2009), https://www.slagell.info/Adam_J.
_Slagell/Publications_files/TAM7.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/A6VU-5P67].
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the capacities of traditional policy-making processes. Some scholars
have gestured at general concerns regarding rapid technological
change,16 although as of this writing these concerns remain largely
undertheorized. While full development of such a theory exceeds the
scope of this Article,17 it makes an important step forward by describ-
ing a tractable example of a policy-making failure that can be traced
from start to (near) finish.18
Modern computer and information systems require various degrees
of and methods for security, one of which includes a concept known as
“authentication”—the ability of the system to confirm that the human
interacting with it is who they claim and that they possess the proper
authority for those interactions. As discussed in section III.B., authen-
tication credentials, including usernames and passwords, form the
primary method of this process. Yet, as most users of modern comput-
ing systems are aware, passwords are largely considered cumbersome
and unusable—too complex to remember, too frequently changing,
and largely regarded as insecure.
B. Complex Passwords: A Case Study
This section challenges the assumptions of security theatre regard-
ing passwords and authentication, arguing that password-complexity
requirements are an illusory solution resulting in large part from the
problems of policy entrenchment and a breakdown between the expec-
tations of the policy-making process and the manner in which rapidly
changing technical fields develop and articulate their knowledge
bases.
Organizations often require users to have certain complexity ele-
ments in their passwords, such as multiple classes19 of characters.
This security measure was developed in consultation with experts in
cryptography and cryptanalysis, who (correctly) informed policy mak-
ers that (in the abstract case) the more complex passwords are harder
16. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION
2.0 (2006).
17. The author anticipates completing future work further exploring these concepts.
18. Shortly before publication of this Article, the U.S. National Institute for Stan-
dards and Technology released guidance expressly repudiating the efficacy of
password complexity within the authentication context. GRASSI ET AL., supra note
2. As of the time of writing, however, the author anticipates that substantial time
will be required before those recommendations are incorporated into legislative,
regulatory, and—lastly—organizational policy, in large part for the reasons ar-
ticulated in Part IV of this Article.
19. A character class is a (somewhat arbitrary) delineation of categories of text char-
acters. Traditionally, these are keyboard characters that are grouped into four
classic sets: uppercase (English) alphabet characters, lowercase (English) al-
phabet characters, (decimal) numerals, and special characters, which usually
comprise punctuation.
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to compromise than less complex passwords. As a result, most organi-
zations have implemented password-complexity requirements,20 and
some policy makers considered imposing strict requirements.
Most readers of this Article likely have encountered (and perhaps
even been frustrated by) a password-complexity requirement for a
computer system or Internet service they have used. Some readers
may even have questioned the efficacy or necessity or such practices.
As the following example illustrates, such questions hold merit—the
efficacy and necessity of password-complexity requirements are, as
yet, unsubstantiated by empirical evidence for most contexts.21 Yet
such requirements have become industry standard practice22 and
have even become part of generally applicable policy making at the
federal level in the United States.23
The concept of password complexity is the proposition that by re-
quiring users to select passwords meeting certain restrictions, the
overall security of an information system is improved by decreasing
the likelihood that an attacker will be able to guess a given user’s
password. This concept is a proverbial sacred cow in computer-secur-
ity literature, vigorously defended both in academic and professional
publications.24 Yet the scientific origins and bases of this proposition
20. See Rajat Bhargava, Why Should I Enforce Password Complexity Requirements,
JUMPCLOUD (Nov. 18, 2015), https://jumpcloud.com/blog/reasons-to-implement-
password-complexity-requirements [https://perma.unl.edu/4PRL-5LFH].
21. Certain “high reliability” environments—such as strategic-arms-control systems,
commercial aviation, and nuclear-energy generation—are more likely to benefit
from any marginal security afforded by such measures and concurrently be able
to implement the strict operational controls required to prevent users from cir-
cumventing password complexity requirements. See infra subsection III.B.3.
22. Richard Shay et al., Designing Password Policies for Strength and Usability, 5
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. & SYS. SECURITY 1, 4–5 (2016).
23. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX INFORMATION SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR FED-
ERAL, STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES (2016); Paul N. Otto et al., The ChoicePoint
Dilemma: How Data Brokers Should Handle the Privacy of Personal Information,
5 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 15 (2006); Benjamin R. Dryden, The FTC’s Use of
Section 5 to Regulate Internet Password Security, ICARUS (Commc’ns & Dig. Tech.
Indus. Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Chicago, Ill.), Winter
2011, at 4.
24. See, e.g., SHIRLEY GAW & EDWARD W. FELTEN, PASSWORD MANAGEMENT STRATE-
GIES FOR ONLINE ACCOUNTS (2016), https://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2006/proceed-
ings/p44_gaw.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4E57-7PV5]; SHON HARRIS & FERNANDO
MAYMI´, CISSP ALL-IN-ONE EXAM GUIDE 751–52 (2016); DANIEL MCCARNEY, PASS-
WORD MANAGERS: COMPARATIVE EVALUATION, DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND EM-
PIRICAL ANALYSIS (2013), https://binaryparadox.net/assets/pubs/McCarney.MCS
.Archive.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/73MB-MRQT]; RICHARD SHAY, CREATING US-
ABLE POLICIES FOR STRONGER PASSWORDS WITH MTURK (2015), https://pdfs.seman
ticscholar.org/1f97/d867d4934778031a9b17ee2b998b82cbff57.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/P73N-LUJD]; Lorrie Cranor, Time to Rethink Mandatory Password
Changes, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/techftc/2016/03/time-rethink-mandatory-password-changes [https://
perma.unl.edu/ETA8-22TX].
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remain somewhat murky, obfuscated by conclusory assumptions in
the relevant literature. Discussions with relevant experts in the field
suggest that this proposition originated with a 1979 paper by Robert
Morris and Ken Thompson of Bell Laboratories titled Password Secur-
ity: A Case History.25 While apparently quite applicable at the time,
the context of information systems has changed vastly from the time
at which Morris and Thompson wrote. While the author currently is
undertaking a comprehensive literature review to investigate the
chain of causality from this work to present literature, based on dis-
cussions of earlier drafts of this Article, it appears that until 2007,26
little work was conducted directly to reexamine the continued applica-
bility of Morris and Thompson’s original proposition.27
It is these conclusory assumptions that stovepipe the concept of
password-complexity analysis in cybersecurity. A review of the lead-
ing literature on password complexity reveals a deep analysis of the
usability, guessability, and other probabilistic metrics of password-
complexity requirements.28 However, very little literature addresses
either of the following two critical questions: (1) Are complex pass-
words the most efficient means to achieve the defensive goals they fa-
cilitate; and (2) if not, does the marginal benefit (if any) of complex
passwords—in addition to more efficient techniques for protecting
data—justify any other costs or vulnerabilities introduced into the
system as a result of increased complexity requirements?29 The lack of
satisfactory answers to these questions within the existing literature
results in the disconnect between scientists and policy makers at the
heart of this Article. Because existing work fails to demonstrate em-
pirically (or even test) whether complex passwords have a net positive
impact on overall system security, it becomes extremely difficult for
policy makers to overcome policy entrenchment.30 Put vastly more
simply, no one has scientifically answered the question: Are complex
passwords “worth it”? This Article asks why such a question has gone
25. Robert Morris & Ken Thompson, Password Security: A Case History, 22 COMM.
ACM 594 (1979).
26. See FLORENCIO ET AL., supra note 7.
27. The author specifically invites comments on this point and is eager to learn of
work conducted between 1979 and 2007 in this regard.
28. See Usable and Secure Passwords, CARNEGIE MELLON U., http://sc.cs.cmu.edu/re-
search-detail/51-usable-and-secure-passwords [https://perma.unl.edu/JJP9-
BS99] (providing a list of helpful resources under the heading “Project
Publications”).
29. See, e.g., FLORENCIO ET AL., supra note 7; see Casey Johnson, Password Complex-
ity Rules More Annoying, Less Effective than Lengthy Ones, ARS TECHNICA (June
28, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/06/password-complexity-rules-
more-annoying-less-effective-than-length-ones [https://perma.unl.edu/D2D3-
7CRQ]; Passwords and Authentication Research, CARNEGIE MELLON CYLAB, http:/
/cups.cs.cmu.edu/passwords.html [https://perma.unl.edu/N9C6-LHEG].
30. See Ranchorda´s, supra note 10.
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largely unaddressed for so long—nearly forty years from Morris and
Thompson’s 1979 work until the 2017 reversal of NIST guidance to
recommend against overly complex passwords.
1. Fundamentals of Password Complexity
Password complexity primarily stems from concerns regarding the
“guessability” of knowledge-based authentication tokens (e.g., pass-
words) used in computing systems. Unlike immutable characteristic-
based authentication tokens (e.g., biometrics) that measure what a
user is or possession-based authentication tokens (e.g., digital smart
cards) that measure what a user has, knowledge-based authentication
tokens measure what a user knows and then shares with the system
provider—or as it is commonly called, the shared secret.31 This is a
critically important method of authentication because, at least as long
as neurological science remains unable to observe precise thoughts of
individuals, knowledge-based authentication tokens are both unob-
servable32 and inalienable.33
The unobservability and inalienability of passwords thus makes
guessing a user’s secret (i.e., password) seem the most likely vector of
attack. Therefore, the probability of success in guessing, whether by
characteristic-based attacks,34 probabilistic-based attacks,35 or pure
31. Saikat Chakrabarti & Mukesh Singhal, Password-Based Authentication: Prevent-
ing Dictionary Attacks, COMPUTER, June 2007, at 68, http://www.cs.nccu.edu.tw/
~raylin/MasterCourse/AuthenticationSystem/2010Fall/PasswordAuthentication
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/BW6L-KFB4].
32. Unlike immutable characteristic-based tokens, such as biometrics, a person’s
thoughts cannot (yet) be captured by human or technological observation. By con-
trast, both fingerprints and optical patterns can be observed discreetly using
over-the-counter technology such as a smartphone camera with sufficient accu-
racy to replicate the biometric data such security measures use to authenticate a
user. It is perhaps worth mentioning that to be used, a knowledge-based authen-
tication token must be shared (and therefore become observable by at least one
other person or object). However, this distinction is orthogonal to the present
claim.
33. Unlike possession-based authentication tokens, such as digital smart cards, a
person’s thoughts cannot be physically “stolen” from them—only in the extremely
improbable case of advanced psychological “reprogramming” or deliberate,
targeted traumatic brain injury is the relevant knowledge replicated or de-
stroyed. While it remains true that the input process of a password could be sub-
ject to observation, see generally ANDREW KELLY, CRACKING PASSWORDS USING
KEYBOARD ACOUSTICS AND LANGUAGE MODELING (2010), https://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/
publications/thesis/online/IM100855.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8J8Q-FCM5],
this type of attack is equally applicable to both immutable characteristic-based
authentication tokens and possession-based authentication tokens and is thus an
issue orthogonal to the differential importance of passwords.
34. Characteristic-based attacks are those which rely on context-sensitive knowledge
about the user to attempt password combinations that an individual user is likely
to employ, such as permutations of their own and their family members’
birthdates.
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brute-force methods,36 would seem a critical measure in evaluating
system security. If an attacker were easily able to guess a user’s pass-
word, then system security would be impaired. And the more complex
that users’ passwords are required to be, the less likely it is that an
attacker would be able to guess those passwords—or so the (empiri-
cally unsubstantiated) story goes.
This widely accepted37 (but unproven) proposition in security re-
quires one rather substantial assumption—that an attacker has an
available vector by which to repeatedly guess passwords.38 Essen-
tially, in order for the complexity of passwords to have any defensive
efficacy, the attacker must first achieve one of the following steps: (1)
acquire a copy of the password-storage files from the system; (2) com-
promise the authentication interface into which the username and
password are entered; (3) otherwise compromise the system in a fash-
ion enabling the attacker to surveil users’ login attempts and observe
their credentials; or (4) achieve some privilege which allows the at-
tacker to physically observe the entry of the credentials. Additionally,
password complexity will play a role if the authentication interface
does not employ techniques to limit the number of password-guessing
attempts. More generally, in the case of brute-force attacks, the at-
tacker must either be able to run an offline analysis against a file con-
taining users’ credentials39 or make very large numbers of guesses
which are confirmed or rejected by the system in real time. Essen-
tially, an attacker must already have compromised the system in some
way before password guessing would become an effective technique.
Yet, as discussed previously, much modern computer-science litera-
ture skipped this step and jumped straight to the assumption—car-
35. Probabilistic attacks, commonly referred to as “dictionary attacks,” are those
which rely on generalized context for classes of users, such as permutations of
common (U.S.) English words for the passwords of users in a U.S.-based organi-
zation. In addition to language dictionaries, attackers now have extensive “dic-
tionaries” of commonly used passwords which are traded like commodities
throughout electronic black markets (colloquially, the Dark Web). See
Chakrabarti & Singhal, supra note 31, at 69.
36. Pure brute-force methods make no assumptions about the probable composition
of passwords beyond the enforced complexity requirements and iterate through
every possible combination consistent with those requirements. An example
brute-force attack on a decimal-numeric-only password would begin with the
password “0,” iterate through to the password “9,” begin the next cycle with “10”
continuing through to “99,” then “100” through “999,, and so on.
37. As noted by revisions to NIST guidance published during the publication process
of this Article, commentators have recently begun questioning this proposition.
See GRASSI ET AL., supra note 2.
38. Such vectors can include both online attacks (repeated attempts against an active
authentication interface) and offline attacks (cryptanalytic analysis of authenti-
cation credential storage). See Chakrabarti & Singhal, supra note 31.
39. In other words, the attackers must be able to analyze users’ username–password
combinations or their cryptographically stored equivalents.
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ried over from 1979—that systems did not protect against “brute-force
guessing” through other means.
2. “Guessability”—the False Assumption
It is this false assumption—that processes for attackers to guess
passwords necessarily exist—which underpins the continuing of the
false (and possibly scientifically disproven40) belief that complex pass-
words are an essential element of information security for all cases.
Recent scientific cybersecurity literature generally is silent on the
question of necessity,41 and professional-practice literature in cyber-
security anecdotally documents and proceeds to assume the extant
presence of such processes but also fails to address the necessity of
such processes.42 This Article argues that necessity is a provable
falsehood—that for all cases there exist superior methods to suffi-
ciently mitigate the possibility of password-guessing processes. This
argument rests on the net cost–benefit economic framing of the prob-
lem proposed in this Article. If correct, this argument has substantial
implications for the process of engaging technological expertise in pol-
icy making because that framing would satisfy the condition of demon-
strating not only lack of efficacy but also actual net harm. This
demonstration would be the type hypothesized to satisfy the thresh-
olds required to overcome policy entrenchment.
As discussed above, neither scientific nor professional-practice
literature adequately describes the reasoning behind why passwords
necessarily are guessable. This section summarizes the anecdotal in-
formation I have gathered over the years of working and conducting
research in this area. Cross-referenced with teaching materials from
computer science43 and professional practice texts,44 it discusses the
most probable attack vectors against which complex password purport
to protect and identifies why in each case a superior defensive method
exists. The work done in 2007 by Florencio, Herley, and Coskun un-
derpins this analysis.45
40. See FLORENCIO ET AL., supra note 7.
41. See Bhargava, supra note 20.
42. See VERIZON, 2016 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT (2016), http://www.ver-
izonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2016_Report_en_xg.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/7ZMV-UYJB]; Denise Ranghetti Pilar et al., Passwords Usage
and Human Memory: A Survey Across Age and Educational Background, 7 PLOS
ONE, December 2012, at 1; Michael Kan, Survey Says Many Companies Want to
Phase Out Passwords, CSO ONLINE (Oct 14, 2016), http://www.csoonline.com/arti-
cle/3131325/security/survey-says-many-companies-want-to-phase-out-passwords
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2RB9-ZWF6].
43. JIANXIN YAN ET AL., THE MEMORABILITY AND SECURITY OF PASSWORDS—SOME EM-
PIRICAL RESULTS (2000), https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-500
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/NDK7-D4F3].
44. See, e.g., HARRIS & MAYMI´, supra note 24.
45. See, e.g., FLORENCIO ET AL., supra note 7.
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a. Password Guessing Via Authentication (Login) Interfaces
Perhaps the most commonly asserted attack vector for password
guessing is the authentication interface, or login screen. This also is
perhaps the most preposterous claim as to the efficacy of complex
passwords as a defensive mechanism. The claim rests on the presump-
tion that the authentication interface will allow virtually unlimited
attempts to guess a user’s password. This is an absolutely unneces-
sary condition, and techniques to defeat such attempts have existed in
computer security for decades.46 Perhaps obvious to the lay user, lim-
iting the number of login attempts before a user’s account is locked is
a complete defense against this type of attack. Many permutations of
this type of defense exist and can be tailored to suit the usability
needs of an organization or public-facing system.47
b. Password Guessing Via Unprotected/Unsanitized Service
Authentication interfaces are not the only means by which pass-
word validity can be verified in real time. Various information ser-
vices, most commonly web and database services, can provide means
by which an attacker can send inquiries to a computer server, the re-
sponse to which would indicate whether particular authentication cre-
dentials (usually username–password combinations) were valid. Such
services generally allow for this inquiry–response exchange outside
the traditional authentication interface and therefore theoretically
may bypass the authentication-attempt-limiting techniques described
above. Remediating this vulnerability, however, is simply a matter of
engaging in engineering practices that require that similar authenti-
cation-attempt-limiting techniques are also applied to any service
which makes use of or allows access to the general authentication ser-
vice. In other words, the designers of a system should ensure that fre-
quency limits are placed on any function that can check the validity of
a username–password combination.
c. Offline Password Attacks
Offline password attacks comprise the set of techniques which in-
volves the use of cryptanalytic techniques to determine a user’s pass-
word based on some stored information to which the attacker has
gained access. Most commonly, this is the password storage table—
46. See HARRIS & MAYMI´, supra note 24.
47. See FRANCISCO CORELLA, PROTECTING A MULTIUSER WEB APPLICATION AGAINST
ONLINE PASSWORD-GUESSING ATTACKS (2007), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
2311/75a1b87473954dea7c26f78b0a5bf41f8fba.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/G9FD-
L7CE]; FRANCISCO CORELLA, SECURE PASSWORD RESET IN A MULTIUSER WEB AP-
PLICATION (2007), https://pomcor.com/whitepapers/secure_password_reset.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/XM82-Z8PE].
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the database or other storage structure in which a system maintains
records to verify the authenticity of user passwords.48
A first-order critique of complex passwords as a defense against
offline attacks is straightforward—if the attacker already has the
password tables, the system is already compromised. More precisely,
in order to acquire the stored information against which cryptanalytic
techniques can be applied, the attacker must first find some vulnera-
bility that affords privileged access to the system. In this case, while it
is true that access to the password table might enable the attacker to
inflict some small amount of further damage against the system or
other systems,49 the primary focus for allocating limited defensive re-
sources should be on the original point of compromise that allowed the
attacker to acquire the password tables in the first place.
Nonetheless, it remains a worthwhile question to investigate what
additional net gain (even if small) in security is afforded by making
difficult offline analysis of password storage tables, particularly be-
cause of the problem of password reuse.50 Here too, however, the logic
of password complexity fails—a clearly superior defense to password
complexity exists.
In the context of offline attacks, the logic of password complexity as
a defense mechanism is predicated on the concept that passwords are
stored in some type of cryptographically complex format. Were pass-
words simply stored in plain text, the complexity of the password
would be irrelevant to the attacker—once the password-storage sys-
tem was compromised, the actual passwords would be human reada-
ble. Thus, for complex passwords to afford any benefit in the context of
offline attacks, the system in question must employ some type of cryp-
tographic technique to store other information that cannot be used as
the password but can be used to check the validity of the password.
The most common type of technique is a one-way hash.51 Such tech-
niques sometimes are collectively referred to as secure password stor-
age (techniques).
Secure password storage has come under criticism in recent years
as an insufficient defensive measure. With massive worldwide in-
48. See Li Shancang et al., Password Pattern and Vulnerability Analysis for Web and
Mobile Applications, 14 ZTE COMM. 32, 33 (2016).
49. Password reuse is a common phenomenon in which an individual user will em-
ploy the same authentication credentials (usually username and password)
across multiple information systems. See Shay et al., supra note 22, at 16–17.
50. See HARRIS & MAYMI´, supra note 24.
51. See, e.g., MONI NAOR & MOTI YUNG, UNIVERSAL ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS AND
THEIR CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS (1995), http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/
~naor/PAPERS/uowhf.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/K54C-MC7T]. See generally
Universal One-Way Hash Function, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uni-
versal_one-way_hash_function [https://perma.unl.edu/KH3D-K59N] (providing a
summary discussion of the principle).
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creases in access to computer power, primarily through cloud-comput-
ing services, attackers are able to pre-compute many possible secure-
storage equivalents for commonly used hash functions.52 This tech-
nique, which generates large databases known as “rainbow tables,” is
similar to creating a large phone book. When an attack acquires a
password-storage table, they simply take the stored hash and look up
what password it corresponds to in the rainbow table. Proponents of
complex passwords argue that such requirements reduce the efficacy
of rainbow table-based attacks because the larger the space of poten-
tial passwords, the greater computation power is required and the less
likely the attacker’s “phone book” will contain the password.
There are two logical flaws with this argument. First, it assumes
that requiring complex passwords will successfully decrease the likeli-
hood that actual users’ passwords (as opposed to potential but unused
passwords) will appear in the attackers’ phone books. One of the chal-
lenges of complex passwords is that they are difficult for users to re-
member, and one technique users employ to circumvent such memory
challenges is selecting the easiest compliant password.53 For example,
under complexity rules requiring at least one lowercase letter, at least
one uppercase letter, and at least one number, the password “Pass-
word1” becomes both easy to remember and widely used.54 Attackers
do not simply generate rainbow tables based on all possible combina-
tions. The concept of dictionary attacks, well-known throughout cyber-
security, indicates that attackers create “dictionaries” of commonly
used passwords. They use these not online for online guessing attacks
of the forms discussed in the sections above but also for offline attacks
in selecting which “words” to include in their phone books. In addition,
consumers typically reuse the same password across a large number
of services. Hence, once an attacker has associated a user account with
a particular password hash, the probability increases that the creden-
tials can be reused in other services or attacks. Thus, the efficacy of
complex passwords in defending against these types of pre-computa-
tion attacks is limited by the psychological and usability constraints of
human beings—if complex passwords are difficult to remember and
attackers know users are likely to circumvent memory difficulties in a
specific way, they can tailor their attacks accordingly.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, complex passwords should
not be the primary line of defense against pre-computation attacks be-
52. See, e.g., Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon
.com/ec2 [https://perma.unl.edu/K23J-8LTE]; RAINBOWCRACK, http://project-
rainbowcrack.com/index.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/B5EU-MVDC]; Rich Miller,
Inside Amazon’s Cloud Computing Infrastructure, DATA CTR. FRONTIER (Sept. 23,
2015), http://datacenterfrontier.com/inside-amazon-cloud-computing-infrastruc-
ture [https://perma.unl.edu/3PS4-47SN].
53. See Shay et al., supra note 22, at 5.
54. See id.
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cause other techniques exist which dramatically limit the abilities of
attackers to generate their rainbow table phone books successfully.
For example, small modifications to the storage functions can render
attackers’ phone books completely ineffective.55 Such techniques are
both highly effective and more efficiently scaled to increased comput-
ing power than the approach of requiring humans to remember in-
creasingly lengthy and complex passwords.
3. “Defense in Depth”—Measuring Marginal Benefit
“Defense in depth” is a term often invoked by the cybersecurity
community to justify additional and often costly security measures.56
While certainly not inherently negative, such a brute-force approach
to security is not necessarily efficient. Security resources will necessa-
rily be limited, so deploying those resources in the most effective man-
ner is crucial. Thus, the term “costly” here becomes particularly
important because, while there exists empirical research discussing
the direct financial cost of security measures and estimated financial
losses from data breaches,57 such research fails to discuss other types
of costs. Lost efficiency from the usability constraints of policies such
as password-complexity requirements, the creation of new attack vec-
tors, and organizations’ operational impairment have yet to become a
focus of empirical cost–benefit research in cybersecurity. The critical
element here again is the lack of a net cost–benefit economic analysis
to determine the appropriate allocation of limited security resources.
The problem with existing discussions of defense in depth, there-
fore, is that little (if any) attention focuses on the marginal rate of
return for the next investment in or layer of defense. In certain high-
reliability environments, such as strategic-weapons-control systems,
commercial-aviation operations, or nuclear-energy generation, margi-
nal rate of return may be a lower concern—or, stated differently, the
value placed on additional security is sufficiently high that it justifies
increased cost. However, in other environments such as consumer
websites, where operational tradeoffs may introduce other vulnerabili-
ties, the value of additional security may not be worth the additional
55. In cybersecurity, such modifications to hash functions are referred to as “salts,”
hence the etymology of the term (and blog) Salted Hash. See generally Samuel
Glibbs, Passwords and Hacking: The Jargon of Hashing, Salting, and SHA-2 Ex-
plained, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/dec/15/passwords-hacking-hashing-salting-sha-2 [https://perma.unl.edu/
Y4RT-VN6L].
56. For early work describing the benefits of this strategy, see NAT’L SEC. AGENCY,
DEFENSE IN DEPTH: A PRACTICAL STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING INFORMATION ASSUR-
ANCE IN TODAY’S HIGHLY NETWORKED ENVIRONMENTS (2001).
57. See, e.g., VERIZON, supra note 42; The Global State of Information Security Survey
2017, PWC, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cyber-security/information-security-
survey.html [https://perma.unl.edu/7WKK-Z39N].
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cost. This type of economic analysis, which disambiguates the security
goals of high-reliability environments from other types of environ-
ments,58 appears virtually absent from the existing cybersecurity and
cybersecurity-policy literature.59 It seems intuitively strange to apply
concepts from high-reliability environments to other operational envi-
ronments without considering the degree to which such concepts
translate. Yet this is precisely what occurs in cybersecurity when de-
fense in depth is invoked to justify additional security measures.
In the context of passwords, defense in depth is effectively a
fallback justification applicable whenever specific justifications for
password complexity are challenged. A strictly additive measure of
system security would, in fact, conclude that notwithstanding the
analysis in the section above, complex passwords do increase system
security (even if only marginally so over other measures). However,
strictly additive measures are a deeply incomplete metric for evaluat-
ing system security.
Such approaches assume that decreased usability will not drive
users to circumvent system-security measures or at least that such
circumvention can be limited with even more stringent security mea-
sures. For example, in the context of password complexity, concerns
regarding password reuse often drive system administrators to limit
the chronological time before a password can be reused, in an attempt
to ensure that users do not switch from one password to a new one and
then back again. This security measure is designed to enforce more
strictly the requirement that users not reuse passwords.
This assumption has yet to be supported by empirical research. By
contrast, the alternative hypothesis—that decreased usability will
drive users to circumvent system-security measures—is empirically
demonstrable, at least, through overwhelming anecdotal evidence.
While anecdotal evidence is a poor method for drawing more concrete
conclusions, such methods of qualitative analysis can inform future
quantitative analysis. A simple Google search for the terms “yellow
sticky note password” produces sufficient results suggestive that the
concept of password-complexity circumvention should be studied
empirically.60
58. See David Thaw, Data Breach (Regulatory) Effects, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 151, 152–56.
59. Some commenters on this Article suggested that, while not publicly documented,
some organizations may make these types of economic-tradeoff analyses inter-
nally. While certainly a laudable approach, the focus of this Article is macro-level
policy, an end generally not well served by confidential, undocumented, internal
organizational choices by a sufficiently small number of organizations that
neither scientific nor professional literature has yet to document such activity.
60. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search for “Yellow Sticky Note Password”) (last
visited July 15, 2017); see also Alan Henry, The Most Common Hiding Places for
Workplace Passwords, LIFEHACKER (Nov. 13, 2012), http://lifehacker.com/58526
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In a well-known example of password-complexity circumvention,
then-U.S. Vice Presidential Candidate Sarah Palin’s Yahoo! email ac-
count was compromised via the password-reset function.61 Most con-
sumer websites have a function that allows a user to reset his or her
password by answering a series of questions. These questions, how-
ever, typically comprise personal information which is also either a
matter of or easily derivable from public record. For example, common
questions include “What was your city of birth?”62 and “What was
your high school mascot?”63 The need for such questions to be easy to
recall is linked to the difficulty many users have with remembering
complex passwords. Yet if a user’s password can be easily reset with
questions answerable from public knowledge,64 net marginal impact
of password-complexity requirements may in fact be negative, as a
new attack vector is created for attackers. A similar analysis could be
applied to the yellow sticky note problem described above.
I do not intend to suggest that marginal benefits from various se-
curity measures (including complex passwords) do not exist nor that
such marginal benefits are never justified. Rather, this analysis fo-
cuses on disambiguating the unsubstantiated assertion that certain
security measures—such as complex passwords—are always better
and instead suggests that the integration of interdisciplinary research
such as techniques from economics, psychology, and organizational
science can better inform the selection of optimal security for a given
operational context.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STOVEPIPING DISJUNCTURE
The example of password complexity and this revised stovepiping
story suggest two key results for the process of policy making in an
age of rapid technological change.
First, there must be proper connection between questions on which
policy makers seek guidance and the corresponding questions that re-
67/the-most-common-hiding-places-for-workplace-passwords [https://perma.unl
.edu/J9YF-3QYJ] (describing an I.T. worker’s experiences finding passwords hid-
den on scraps of paper around offices).
61. See Terry Baynes, Sarah Palin Email Hacker Loses Appeal, REUTERS (Jan. 30,
2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palin-hacking-idUSTRE80T1UQ2012
0130 [https://perma.unl.edu/2ZPS-7JGH].
62. Birth records in the United States are generally a matter of public record.
63. Putting aside the fact that many individuals list their high school on social-
networking websites such as Facebook, for a nontrivial percentage of the popula-
tion (at least for the purposes of cyber adversaries), the high school they attended
can be predicted from their place of birth, and birth records are a matter of public
record. Most U.S. high schools have public-facing websites or Wikipedia entries
that, at least, indicate their athletic mascot.
64. The argument that many consumer websites send password-reset instructions
via email is also assailable as public Internet email communications are (by defi-
nition) insecure and subject to interception with the proper equipment.
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searchers answer. This is of particular import in an age of rapid tech-
nological change because policy entrenchment can occur before
mistakes can be recognized and corrected.
Second, when policy change is required, whether because of under-
lying change in circumstances or original error, scientific evidence
must not only describe the change but must characterize that change
in a manner suited to overcoming policy entrenchment and the stan-
dards for policy rescission. This latter category suggests a risk-ana-
lytic framing of cybersecurity questions which currently is
underdeveloped in scientific, professional, and policy literature. While
comparative analysis of the efficacy of risk-analytic frameworks still
requires further investigation, initial evidence suggests that a risk-
analytic framework is substantially more effective at preventing
cybersecurity incidents and enabling organizations to protect critical
assets.65 Cybersecurity is a particularly instructive example as secur-
ity contexts often require heightened evidence to justify overcoming
security theater.
A. Addressing the Same Question
If complex passwords are such a bad idea, how did they become
industry standard practice?66 The answer is cybersecurity stovepip-
ing. While it is true that more complex passwords would, in the purely
theoretical case, make passwords more difficult to attack, this answer
fails to communicate the full set of relevant scientific knowledge. As
discussed above, this is mathematically true—the more complex the
password space (the realm of possibilities), the more difficult it is to
“brute force” the password (guess it by trying every possible combina-
tion). And, under certain extremely limited conditions, the marginal
additional security afforded by such complexity may have a net secur-
ity benefit for the overall system. Under most circumstances, however,
the marginal additional security benefit would fall well short of the
marginal additional-security detriment from additional attack vectors
introduced as a result of password complexity—the most notable be-
ing the password-reset function. Thus, the net cost–benefit analysis
would not suggest, in most cases, that complex passwords increase
system security.
Part of this breakdown came from a failure of scientific research to
link the complete technical picture to a comprehensive analysis capa-
ble of overcoming policy inertia and entrenchment. Additionally, how-
ever, there was a failure of communication between scientists and
policy makers as to what question was being addressed. When policy
65. See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
287 (2014).
66. See HARRIS & MAYMI´, supra note 24.
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makers inquired how to make passwords safer, what they really in-
tended to ask was: What approach will make authentication interfaces
more difficult to compromise? That answer, which is quite different
than a brute-force-complexity analysis, involves understanding ele-
ments of network security, information-systems design, user interface
and user-experience design, and which parties are most efficiently sit-
uated and equipped to bear the cost of increased security. In other
words, rather than asking a cryptography question, policy makers
should have been asking a question involving several subfields of com-
puter science, psychology, organizational operations, and economic
theory. Had that question been asked—and were it to be asked to-
day—the answer most likely would be: There are ways to secure au-
thentication processes which allow users to employ passwords the
average person is capable of remembering, provided other steps are
taken to secure the system.67 The proposition of this hypothetical an-
swer appears to be correct based on the revisions to the NIST gui-
dance on authentication practices published in 2017.68
Of course, the process of policy entrenchment is well established on
the issue of passwords, so this latter question would likely make little
difference for password policy at this late stage.69 The former ques-
tion—what character of evidence is required to overcome policy en-
trenchment—is key for the current state of authentication practices
and password policy. The example, however, is illustrative of a point
relevant to policy-making processes more generally: before policy en-
trenchment occurs, when engaging scientific expertise, it is critical to
ensure that the policy question being asked matches the scientific
question being answered.
B. Overcoming Policy Entrenchment
Part II of this Article introduces the hypothesis that policy en-
trenchment explains the failure of scientific research in cybersecurity
to correct erroneous policy regarding password complexity. Part III ex-
amines this problem in detail and concludes that existing research did
suggest against current password complexity policies but, as virtually
every Internet user is aware, such policies persist.
67. Cf. Usable and Secure Passwords, supra note 28 (providing links to information
about password security and research about password “guessability”).
68. See GRASSI ET AL., supra note 2.
69. Given the recent changes in NIST guidance and the personal mea culpa of the
author of those original standards (both of which occurred during the publication
process of this Article), there is cause to think that seeking alternate means of
securing authentication interfaces and facilitating password use may not be fu-
tile exercise. Nonetheless, there still exists substantial inertia—both in policy en-
trenchment and in industry adoption—to overcome in changing direction. See id.;
McMillan, supra note 2.
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Overcoming policy entrenchment requires more than simply show-
ing that earlier circumstances have changed. At the time Morris and
Thompson wrote their seminal piece on password-complexity issues in
late-1970s UNIX systems,70 their analysis was correct within its con-
text. Assumptions regarding system configuration at the time sug-
gested that passwords more complex than those in use at the time
(e.g., dictionary words as short as three or four characters) were re-
quired for adequate security. By the time Florencio, Herley, and Cos-
kun responded in 2007,71 the landscape of information systems had
fundamentally changed. As discussed in their work and in Part III of
this Article, complex passwords no longer achieve net-positive security
benefits in most cases.72 Furthermore, Florencio, Herley, and Coskun
were hardly the first to point out this failure in their 2007 work. What
was missing was the connection to a risk-analytic framing of cyber-
security, which would allow policy makers to overcome entrenchment
and justify a change in course of policy direction. More simply—policy
makers lacked the relevant evidence to change direction because the
scientific evidence showed only that the previous conclusion was no
longer correct and not that the previous conclusion might be causing
ongoing net negative effects.
C. Risk-Analytic Framework for Cybersecurity
The analysis in this section suggests the need for cybersecurity re-
search, practice, and policy making to employ a risk-analytic frame-
work. Stated more simply, each security measure needs to be
examined in the context of an overall system in empirical practice to
determine whether given measures produce a net positive or net nega-
tive effect when implemented. Current approaches variously define
cybersecurity through mathematical modeling73 or enumerated com-
pliance,74 with few exceptions.75 Of particular import, these notable
exceptions—applicable to the healthcare and finance industries in the
United States—performed nearly four times more effectively at
preventing data breaches reportable under U.S. law during the period
70. Morris & Thompson, supra note 25.
71. FLORENCIO ET AL., supra note 7.
72. See id. at 6; supra Part III.
73. See, e.g., DANIEL M. DUNLAVY ET AL., MATHEMATICAL CHALLENGES IN CYBER-
SECURITY (2009), http://www.cs.sandia.gov/~dmdunla/publications/SAND2009-08
05.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/F6WK-797M].
74. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Pacella, The Cybersecurity Threat: Compliance and the Role
of Whistleblowers, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39 (2016); Daniel J. Solove
& Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). See generally WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND
DATA PROTECTION LAW (2016).
75. See Thaw, supra note 65.
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from January 2000 through December 2010.76 Collectively, this evi-
dence and the analysis in this Article suggest an alternate, risk-ana-
lytic-based definition for cybersecurity. This definition can be phrased
as a simple question: Do the risk-mitigation techniques for a given
information system match the risk-tolerance level appropriate to that
system’s goals and functions? This question, while perhaps apparently
simple, is quite complex to unpack and translate to a workable defini-
tion. A regulatory approach I call Federated Regulation, which de-
scribes a unique approach to cybersecurity regulation used in U.S.
federal health-care-cybersecurity regulation, has shown substantial
promise in this regard.
Federated Regulation (also known as Management-Based Regula-
tory Delegation) is a theory for engaging private expertise in regula-
tion both on the front end (rulemaking) and on the back end
(compliance).77 It replaces the directly (or “checklist”) style of regula-
tion with one based on a risk-analytic framework, transforming the
regulatory requirement to a four-part process: (1) regulatory authori-
ties define general or “aspirational” areas of concern to be addressed;
(2) regulated entities must conduct risk assessments of those areas
and develop compliance plans consistent with reasonable manage-
ment of those risks; (3) regulated entities must follow their own com-
pliance plans; and (4) the plans must be “reasonable” and be updated
periodically and with changes in the organization’s risk profile. As de-
scribed by Perri and Thaw:
This process has been very successful in engaging private expertise to manage
healthcare privacy and cybersecurity in the United States. Under this model,
legislatures establish an organic statutory framework that calls upon an ad-
ministrative agency to develop regulations in conjunction with the entities
subject to that regulation (and other relevant stakeholders). The regulations
then promulgated by the agency, rather than defining strict standards for
compliance, instead, lay out general or aspirational goals for regulated enti-
ties to achieve. Entities then are required to develop compliance plans which
reasonably achieve those goals, and to follow their own plans. This last step
76. Id. at 354–55.
77. See id. at 324–26 (describing Management-Based Regulatory Delegation as hav-
ing two collaborative parts: the promulgation of aspirational goals by the legisla-
tors followed by the industry experts drafting compliance plans to achieve said
goals). This method, as discussed in further detail elsewhere, combines Kenneth
Bamberger’s theory of regulatory delegation in rulemaking with Cary Coglianese
and David Lazer’s theory of management-based regulation for compliance to de-
scribe a process which engages private expertise to draft regulations by allowing
private entities to manage their own compliance process. Pierluigi Perri & David
Thaw, Ancient Worries and Modern Fears: Different Roots and Common Effects of
U.S. and EU Privacy Regulation, 49 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manu-
script at 740–41) (on file with author) (citing Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation
as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Admin-
istrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 386 (2006); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer,
Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Pub-
lic Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 692, 725 (2003)).
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becomes the primary compliance objective, subject to regulatory agency over-
sight for reasonableness of the plans and entities’ adherence to those plans.78
The comparative-efficacy points discussed earlier in this Article
are based primarily on a comparison of Federated Regulation79 and de
facto directive regulation at preventing certain cybersecurity breaches
of statutorily identified “personal information” during the years 2000
through 2010. That preliminary work showed substantially improved
capacity at preventing such breaches, controlling for various factors
such as attractiveness of target; size, scope, and complexity of organi-
zations; defensive capabilities of organizations; and the different time
periods during which organizations first became aware of the threats
facing their data in an internetworked Information Age. While prelim-
inary, the results are pronounced and suggest the promise of Feder-
ated Regulation and similar models at addressing the types of
technologically and scientifically complex problems considered in this
Article.80
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is more expository and descriptive than it is con-
clusory. It does suggest a strong conclusion regarding the efficacy of a
particular cybersecurity policy-making process (password complexity),
and it does suggest a solution for future cybersecurity policy making
(risk-management-oriented policy-making frameworks). This Article
does not, however, take on the greater challenge of addressing how not
to repeat that mistake within other contexts beyond cybersecurity. It
does identify the characteristics that give rise to policy-making fail-
ures and suggests that legal scholarship—indeed the entire legal sys-
tem—must consider the following factors and how to reconcile them:
(1) rapid technological development and change; (2) increasing com-
plexity of social structures (often enabled by technological develop-
ment); and (3) the core and fundamental values of the deliberative
policy-making processes inherent in both direct democratic systems
and representative republican governmental systems. We are enter-
ing into a period of rapid technological development and change. Be-
cause the nature of the antecedent technology—information and
computing technology—is such that it increases the capabilities of
other scientific and technical areas, we are at the beginning of rapid
technological change, not the end. Thus, societal structures will face
technological change undermining fundamental assumptions upon
which those structures rely at an ever-increasing rate. Along with this
change comes complexity.
78. Perri & Thaw, supra note 77 (manuscript at 741) (internal citations omitted).
79. This concept was previously called—somewhat more awkwardly—“Management-
Based Regulatory Delegation.”
80. See generally Thaw, supra note 65.
2017] CYBERSECURITY STOVEPIPING 363
Yet our policy-making systems are designed around extended, de-
liberative processes. When facing a need for technical expertise, those
systems assume that consensus exists as to the technical solutions
and that this consensus does not change more rapidly than policy-
making processes can respond. Furthermore, it assumes that when
consensus is reached among technical experts, that consensus is
backed with valid scientific evidence.
As this Article illustrates, the collisions of these two properties is
deeply worrisome for cybersecurity and for other classes of problems
that bear these characteristics. Part IV suggests that process-based
regulatory structures, such as Federated Regulation, may provide at
least interim solutions. But longer-term consideration of our policy-
making process is necessary, lest the next fundamental error be not on
the scale of irritating passwords but potentially large-scale social or
economic injustices.
